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PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES: THE RIGHT
TO BE DIFFERENT
Chief Justice John Marshall, in the Dartmouth College Case,' set
the precedent for the unique position that private universities hold in
our educational and social systems. Education, he said, when engaged
in by private institutions, is fundamentally a private activity. These in-
stitutions "do not fill the place which would otherwise be occupied by
government, but that which would otherwise remain vacant."2 Private
universities were free to make decisions based on their own priorities
even though operating with aid from the state government, for "money
may be given for education, and the persons receiving it do not, by
being employed in the education of youth, become members of the civil
government." 3  Thus, the strict independence of private universities
from governmental control was established.
This decision has never been overturned, and what the Chief Jus-
tice said in 1819 has been especially important in fostering judicial re-
straint regarding the activities of private universities. Yet, some courts
in recent years have found cause to enter the academic community by
applying the ubiquitous "state action" doctrine. They have reasoned
that the totality of governmental financial aid, chartering, and regula-
tion have created such a close relationship that private universities are
in effect an extension of the state government. Thus, they are subject
to the sanctions of the fourteenth amendment.4
These decisions may ultimately provide an intolerable strain on
the continuation of private higher education. Judge Friendly has con-
ceded that Chief Justice Marshall may have "made things too easy for
himself. ' 5 Yet, when the Second Circuit expanded its concept of "state
action" recently in Jackson v. Statler Foundation,6 he vigorously dis-
1. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
2. Id. at 647.
3. Id. at 635.
4. "No State shall.. . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. H. FRIENDLY, Tim DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PE-
NUMBRA 10 (1969).
6. 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974).
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sented. That case involved a suit brought by a black minister against
various charitable foundations alleging racial discrimination and seeking
declaratory relief and damages under title 42, section 1983 of the
United States Code.7 The majority opinion found that private tax-
exempt foundations are so "entwined" with government that they "in
many instances may well involve 'state action'."'8  Private universities
are, of course, endowed by tax-exempt institutions. It is this tax-
exempt status that enables them to obtain the capital necessary to carry
on the research and experimentation for which they are noted. Judge
Friendly realizing this, called Jackson
the most ill-advised decision with respect to "state action" yet
rendered ....
. . .Simply because of tax exemptions. . . institutions
of higher education . . . endowed by private donors for the
sole or preferential benefit of particular creeds or races, must
open their doors equally to all, with every decision subject
to judicial reexamination, even though this may impair or de-
stroy the very purpose which led the donor to endow them.9
Freedom from judicial interference has historically been the key-
stone of private higher education in this country. Educational innova-
tion cannot always harmonize with the strictures of governmental
sanction. To be sure, many state universities are among our finest in-
stitutions. But conservative boards of regents, responsible to an
elected governor, at times view change as a violation of their sacrosanct
duty. Private universities, on the other hand, can welcome the contro-
versial with impunity. Judge Friendly has seen the value of such
freedom:
It is the very possibility of doing something different
than government can do, of creating an institution free to
make choices government cannot--even seemingly arbitrary
ones-without having to provide a justification that will be
examined in a court of law. .... 10
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The section provides:
Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The "under color of" provision has the same meaning as state action under the four-
teenth amendment. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1965).
8. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974).
9. Id. at 637-38.
10. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 5, at 30.
1975]
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What then, if private universities become accountable at law for
their decisions under the "state action" theory? James Perkins, former
President of Cornell University, has noted the possibility with alarm:
Qualitative decisions are the essence of academic life.
To replace this kind of decision with either civil laws that
must not distinguish between the plumber and the philoso-
pher or with the kind of wrangling over technicalities to which
court action can so easily degenerate would do permanent
damage not only to the sensitive academic process for judg-
ing quality but indeed to quality itself.
Even more fundamental is the damage that constant le-
gal interference can do to institutional autonomy. Institu-
tional autonomy is the surest guardian of academic freedom.
To shift from the rules and procedures that academic institu-
tions have evolved as central to the teaching-learning process
and to put academic discipline, appointment, grading, and all
manner of educational requirements at the mercy of the
courts would mean, quite simply, that civil jurisdiction over
intellectual inquiry would be complete. .... 11
The Supreme Court has recognized this danger in becoming in-
volved in academic affairs and has traditionally shied away from it. In
Sweezy v. New Hampshire12 the Court held that a state legislature had
no right to conduct an investigation into the contents of university lec-
tures. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, spoke of "the
grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion into the intellectual
life of a university" and concluded:
The problems that are the respective preoccupations of an-
thropology, economics, law, psychology, sociology and related
areas of scholarship are merely departmentalized dealing, by
way of a manageable division of analysis, with interpenetrat-
ing aspects of holistic perplexities. For society's good-if
understanding be an essential need of society-inquiries into
these problems, speculations about them, stimulation in others
of reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible.
Political power must abstain from intrusion into this activity
of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government and
the people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and
obviously compelling.13
11. Address by James Perkins, The University and Due Process, American Council
on Education, Dec. 8, 1967, Washington, D.C., 62 Am. LmRARY ASS'N BULL. 977, 981
(1968).
12. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
13. Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This may help explain the recent
dismissal for mootness of Defunia v. Odegeard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
[Vol. 11:58
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More recently, in Healy v. James,'4 the Court clearly stated its ap-
proach to problems involving the administration of university affairs:
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the academic
community, we approach our task with special caution, recog-
nizing the mutual interest of students, faculty members, and
administrators in an environment free from disruptive inter-
ference with the educational process. 15
And the Chief Justice, in a concurring opinion, echoed that it is "within
the academic community that problems such as these should be re-
solved. The courts, state or federal, should be a last resort."16
Where, then, have some courts found the authority to bring private
universities within their jurisdiction? One common method is by apply-
ing the "public function" theory. 1 This reasoning stems from Evans
v. Newton, wherein it was held that a municipal park, by coming under
private control, cannot lose its public character.' s Building on this
logic, courts have held that education is a public function, and that, like
a park, a university is accountable under the "state action" theory even
though under private ownership.1" But these decisions ignore the lan-
guage in Evans that contrasts parks with "schools such as Tuskeegee"
which are in the private sector. The Evans Court went on to note that
"[i]f a testator wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one race
only and in no way implicated the State in the supervision, control,
or management of that facility, we assume arguendo that no constitu-
tional difficulty would be encountered. 20
14. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). The Court struck down a university's denial of official
recognition to a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society.
15. Id. at 171.
16. Id. at 195 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
17. That is, that by providing a service generally identified with the government,
a private entity becomes in effect a branch of the government.
18. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). The Court observed that "[c]onduct that is formally 'pri-
vate' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a gov-
ernmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon
state action." Id. at 299.
19. "This court holds that the conduct of the chief executive of a private university,
in light of the public function of a private university in education, could amount to suf-
ficient 'state action' . . . ." Belk v. Chancellor of Washington University, 336 F. Supp.
45, 49 (E.D. Mo. 1970). See also Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 203
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962).
20. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966) (footnote omitted, emphasis in
original). The distinction has been put this way:
Thus, public education is a state function. . . . Yet the fact that the State
provides tuition-free schools in order to promote an educated citizenry does
not mean that all private educational institutions perform a "public function,"
as that term is used in Evans. . . . To conclude otherwise would have the
effect of eliminating private education.
Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1398 (N.D. Ind. 1970) (citations omitted, em-
phasis in original); affd per curiam 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
1975]
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To be sure, education is the key to the proper functioning of our
constitutional system. This was acknowledged in the landmark case of
Brown v. Board of Education.21 Indeed, the importance attached to
secondary education in 1954 may well apply to university education
today.2 2 But this should not be allowed to blur the essential differences
between public and private education. The right to establish private
schools, and the right of parents to send their children to these schools
is constitutionally protected, 23 and the state cannot regulate the curric-
ula of these schools.2 4  The value of private universities is, as seen by
the Heald Committee, that they "give American education a diversity
and scope not possible in tax-supported institutions alone, and they
have an opportunity to emphasize, if they wish, individualistic patterns
of thought, courses of social action, or political or religious activity."25
It is this diversity that must be protected from encroachment, by
maintaining the public-private distinction. Parents are willing to spend
thousands of dollars to send their children to what they consider to be
the "right" schools. 2 6 The value of a particular school may stem from
such an esoteric quality as its name. It may also depend on what is
taught there, who teaches there, or who else attends. It may even de-
pend on who does not attend, for as Mr. Chief Justice Burger has said,
[t]he private school that closes its doors to defined groups of
students on the basis of constitutionally suspect criteria mani-
fests, by its own actions, that its educational processes are
based on private belief that segregation is desirable in educa-
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court pointed out:
It [education] is required in the performance of our most basic public respon-
sibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.
Id. at 493.
22. The New York Regents have said that "[c]ollege attendance and a college de-
gree are as necessary today as high school attendance and a high school diploma were
in the past. The economic, social, and cultural forces in our society are all pushing
in that direction." Regents of the University of the State of New York, The Regents
Statewide Plan for the Expansion and Development of Higher Education 9 (1964).
And see Martzen v. Martzen, 163 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. 1960), calling college education a
necessity.
23. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924), reaffirmed in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
24. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
25. Meeting the Increasing Demand for Higher Education in New York State: A
Report to the Governor and the Board of Regents 24 (Heald Comm. ed. 1968).
26. For an interesting discussion of the underlying rationale to parental preferences,
see C. J.NcKs & D. RIESMAN, THE AcADMIc RBVOLJTrION (1968).
[Vol. 11: 58
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tion. There is no reason to discriminate against students for
reasons wholly unrelated to individual merit unless the artifi-
cial barriers are considered an essential part of the educa-
tional message to be communicated to the students who are
admitted. Such private bias is not barred by the Constitu-
tion, nor does it invoke any sanction of laws .... 11
Yet, the standards enunciated in Jackson for finding state actions,
if taken literally, would mean that a university can take no private ac-
tion. The Jackson court enumerated
five factors which are particularly important to a determina-
tion of "state action": (1) the degree to which the "private"
organization is dependent on governmental aid; (2) the ex-
tent and intrusiveness of the governmental regulatory
scheme; (3) whether that scheme connotes government ap-
proval of the activity or whether the assistance is merely pro-
vided to all without such connotation; (4) the extent to which
the organization serves a public function or acts as a surrogate
for the State; (5) whether the organization has legitimate
claims to recognition as a "private" organization in associa-
tional or other constitutional terms.28
Certainly, it would be easy enough to fit private universities into any
of these categories. During the turbulent area of campus unrest in the
sixties, many suits were in fact brought to challenge university decisions
under the "state action" theory. A review of these cases will show that
the courts have heretofore not been inclined to accept such an easy
entry into the realm of university policymaking.
Petitioners, in Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University,29
sought redress for being expelled due to their participation in campus
disruptions. Their allegation that state financial aid to education con-
stituted a basis for a finding of "state action" was rejected by the court,
which said that "receipt of money from the State is not, without a good
deal more, enough to make the recipient an agency or instrumentality
of the Government."3  This seems merely to be a reaffirmation of
Dartmouth College, and has been echoed in a number of decisions.-'
What, then, constitutes "a good deal more"? Is it a governmental regu-
latory scheme? The Second Circuit has itself rejected this contention
in Powe v. Miles."32
27. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973).
28. 496 F.2d at 629.
29. 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
30. Id. at 547-48.
31. See, e.g., Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Brodench v. Cath-
olic University, 365 F. Supp. 147 (D.D.C. 1973).
32. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
1975]
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To be sure .. . . whatever Alfred University does is "under
color of' the New York statute incorporating it. But this is
also true of every corporation chartered under a special or
even a general incorporation statute, and not even those tak-
ing the most extreme view of the concept have ever asserted
that state action goes that far ...
[T]he fact that New York has exercised some reg-
ulatory powers over the standard of education offered by
Alfred University does not implicate it generally in Alfred's
policies. .... 33
The Jackson rationale would also have us believe that governmen-
tal approval of private education might establish a basis for finding
"state action". This theory was advanced in Furumoto v. Lyman, 4 an-
other campus disruption case, this time dealing with Stanford Univer-
sity. The district court in Furumoto agreed that there certainly was gov-
ernmental approval-but that that approval was of the pluralistic nature
of our educational system-and "the legislature is thereby promoting
what it views to be the public interest in the existence of private educa-
tional institutions." 35 Attacks under the "public function" theory, as
noted earlier,36 have met with some success. But here, too, the public
nature of education in itself does not establish "state action". In
Grossner, the court acknowledged that "plaintiffs are correct in a trivial
way when they say education is 'impressed with a public interest.'
Many things are."37  Continuing in a footnote, the court reasoned that
"[i]f the law were what plaintiffs declare it to be, the difficult problem
of aid to 'private schools'--specifically parochial schools-would not
exist. . . . Indeed, the very idea of a parochial school would be un-
thinkable. 38
This leads to the final question asked in Jackson: whether schools
can be termed "private" in associational or other constitutional terms.
This has been answered affirmatively in a line of Supreme Court cases
from Dartmouth to Norwood v. Harrison.30
As the Court said in Evans:
33. Id. at 80-81. See also Moose Lodge No. 17 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), re-
jecting state licensing as the basis for state action.
34. 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Calif. 1973).
35. Id. at 1279 (emphasis in original).
36. Supra note 19.
37. 287 F. Supp. at 549.
38. Id. at 549 n.19 (citations omitted).
39. See also cases cited note 23 supra.
[Vol. 11:5 8
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The range of governmental activities is broad and varied, and
the fact that government has engaged in a particular activity
does not necessarily mean that an individual entrepreneur or
manager of the same kind of undertaking suffers the same
constitutional inhibitions.40
We have seen that a dissection of the Jackson criteria does not
establish a sufficient basis for a finding of "state action"-but how
about a combination of these factors? At Chatham College, a "state
action" claim was based on the existence of a state charter, state regula-
tions, tax exemptions, a zoning variance, and public monies. 41 At Stan-
ford, the claim was based on a state charter, corporate powers and priv-
ileges, tax exemptions,and the power of eminent domain.42 And at
Tulane, the state had granted property to the school with a reversionary
clause in the charter, and there were state officers in nominal positions
on the board of directors of the university.43 In each case the courts
found no "state action", for
[s]tate involvement sufficient to transform a private uni-
versity into an agency of the state . . . requires more than
incorporating or chartering the University . . . providing
financial aid in the form of public funds . . . or granting tax
exemptions. . . . Nor does a combination of these condi-
tions constitute the requisite state involvement.44
Indeed, the Supreme Court
has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise
private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection
Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or serv-
ice at all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation
in any degree whatever. . . . [S]uch a holding would utterly
emasculate the distinction between private as distinguished
from state conduct. .. .
It would seem, then, that the Jackson criteria may not be enough
to reach private university education. Care must be exercised though,
40. 382 U.S. at 300.
41. Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F.2d 494 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
42. Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Calif. 1973).
43. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La.
1962), af'd per curiamn, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
44. Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 343 F. Supp. 836, 839 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (ci-
tations omitted).
45. Moose Lodge No. 17 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972). See also Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), where the Court said "[w]e do not suggest that a
State violates its constitutional duty merely because it has provided any form of state
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to be sure. The threat posed by judicial interference cannot be under-
estimated. As Judge Holtzoff has said:
An entering wedge seemingly innocuous at first blush, may
lead step-by-step to a serious external domination of univer-
sities and colleges and a consequent damper and hindrance
to their intellectual development and growth.40
It would be incumbent upon the courts to reiterate the protected posi-
tion of private university education in our system. Perhaps Jefferson's
"wall of separation" should apply to education as well as religion.
There seems to be some basis in what the Supreme Court has said for
this view. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents4 7 it talks of the sanctity
of academic freedom:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding aca-
demic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment. .... 4.
Doesn't that mean that educators must be free to make decisions, based
not always on constitutionally acceptable criteria, without fear of inter-
vention from the courts? The Court has said that
[t]he essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident . . . To impose any strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders . . . would imperil the
future of our Nation.4"
Surely this freedom must include latitude to try new ideas, to form-
ulate novel integrations in academic endeavors, to make education
socially relevant.50 The emergence of private universities to the fore-
front of academic achievement 1 has been in large part due to the ex-
istence of a buffer zone of breathing space in which to experiment. In
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez,r2 the Supreme
Court warned that
46. Green v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D.D.C. 1967).
47. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
48. Id. at 603.
49. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
50. The President's Commission on Campus Unrest has said that
[alcademic institutions must be free-free from outside interference, and free
from internal intimidation. Far too many people who should know better-
both within the university communities and outside them-have forgotten this
first principle of academic freedom. The pursuit of knowledge cannot continue
without the free exchange of ideas.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST, R-11 (1970).
51. The seven best medical schools, four of the top six law schools, and five of the
top six business schools belong to private universities, according to a recent poll of pro-
fessional school deans. The National Observer, February 1, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
52. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
[Vol. 11:58
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the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the
States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circum-
scribe or handicap the continued research and experimenta-
tion so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational
problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing condi-
tions.5.
If such is the restraint applied to public schools, then clearly private
universities must be so protected, for as Judge Holtzoff said:
It would be a dangerous doctrine to permit the Govern-
ment to interpose any degree of control over an institution
of higher learning, merely because it extends financial assist-
ance to it. . . . Such a result would be intolerable, for it
would tend to hinder and control the progress of higher learn-
ing and scientific research. Higher education can flourish
only in an atmosphere of freedom, untrammelled by Govern-
mental influence in any degree. 54
The principles outlined in Dartmouth College, then, must be
revitalized. Our dual educational system must be preserved. The
public university serves the function of producing an educated citizenry,
fostering the state's concept of academic goals, and providing an op-
portunity for betterment to all. As an official extension of governmen-
tal policy, it is necessarily subject to constitutional sanctions. There is
no room for unequal treatment or classifications of suspect validity.
Decisions must be based on true governmental concern for representa-
tion of all the people. Private universities, on the other hand, have
a right to be different. They can try any innovations without being sub-
ject to constitutional inhibitions. Their actions may not always be justi-
fiable, but, importantly, their mistakes are not imputed to the govern-
ment. Therein lies the special value of private universities-their
detachment from the government. Judge Friendly noted:
"If I were asked, 'Would you have Oxford with its self-gov-
ernment, freedom, and independence, but yet with its anom-
alies and imperfections, or would you have the University
free of those anomalies and imperfections, and under the con-
trol of the Government?' I would say, 'Give me Oxford, free
and independent, with all its anomalies and imperfections'."55
So, too, this freedom and independence deserves preservation today.
Franklin J. Pacenza
53. Id. at 43.
54. Greene v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 609, 613 (D.D.C. 1967).
55. H. FRMENDLY, supra note 5, at 30 n.130.
19751
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